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TORTS-WRONGFUL BiRTH-NEW JERSEY RECOGNIZES EMOTIONAL Dis-
TRESS DAMAGES IN A WRONGFUL BIRTH ACrION INVOLVING A DEFORMED
CmLD--Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful birth, I a claim once novel and disfavored, 2 has gradually be-
come accepted as a compensable tort. 3 The New Jersey Supreme Court,
in Berman v. Allan,4 recently recognized wrongful birth as a valid cause
of action. The Bermans sued their doctors after their daughter, Sharon,
was born suffering from Down's syndrome.5 At the time of her preg-
nancy, Mrs. Berman was thirty-eight, an age that carries a high risk of
bearing children with chromosomal abnormalities. 6 The Bermans alleged
1. Wrongful birth is an action brought by parents alleging that the birth of their child caused an
injury to them. Wrongful birth actions should be distinguished from wrongful life actions, in which
the child brings an action alleging that life itself is an injury. Wrongful life actions have been rejected
by the majority of courts, see, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979), Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, -
Cal. App. 3d -, 165 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980). Such actions are beyond the scope of this note. For
articles examining wrongful life as a cause of action, see generally Note, 54 NoTE DAME LAW. 696,
709-12, 715 (1979); Note, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125 (1978).
2. For early cases denying wrongful birth claims, see Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123,
255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen v. Knight, I 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
3. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1977); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See
also Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978).
Actions for wrongful birth may be founded on a theory of contract, as in Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), or on a theory of negligence, as in Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). Actions in negligence may arise when
a sterilization operation performed on one spouse has failed and a child is consequently conceived.
Such actions are often referred to as negligent or wrongful conception claims. See, e.g., Sherlock v.
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). Wrongful birth actions may also be brought where
the negligence occurs after conception, as in cases where the doctor negligently fails to inform a
pregnant mother that her child may be born deformed. See, e.g., Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). For a general discussion of theories upon which wrongful
birth claims have been grounded, see Moore, Wrongful Birth-The Problem of Damage Computa-
tion, 48 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1979). For a commentary on damages recoverable in wrongful
conception cases, see Note, 14 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 784 (1979).
4. 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8(1979).
5. Down's syndrome is a type of mental retardation caused by representation of at least a critical
portion of chromosome 21 three times instead of twice in some or all cells. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICnONARY 1382 (23d ed. 1976).
Down's syndrome children are often more susceptible to infectious diseases and commonly have
vision problems that may require surgery. D. SMrrH & A. WILsoN, THE CHILD wrrH DowN's SYNDROME
41-42 (1973). Approximately 40% of Down's syndrome babies are born with congenital heart de-
fects often requiring open heart surgery. Id. at 41-43.
6. The Nat'l Inst. of Child Health and Human Dev. (NICHD) Nat'l Registry for Amniocentesis
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that the defendant doctors negligently failed to inform them of the risk
involved in Mrs. Berman's pregnancy. Furthermore, they claimed they
were not provided with information about amniocentesis, 7 the most
widely used method of detecting birth defects, even though sound medi-
cal practice dictates that amniocentesis be offered to pregnant women
over the age of thirty-five. 8 But for the defendants' negligence, the Ber-
mans alleged, the chromosomal abnormality would have been detected
and the pregnancy terminated. The Bermans sought monetary damages
for the emotional and pecuniary harm they had suffered and would con-
tinue to suffer as a result of the wrongful birth. The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the case for failure
to state a claim. 9 On appeal, 10 the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed
the trial court decision and held that the Bermans' complaint stated a le-
gally cognizable claim for wrongful birth. 1'
By overruling the landmark precedent of Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 12 Ber-
man's recognition of wrongful birth settles disagreement over the validity
of wrongful birth actions in New Jersey, 13 and follows the trend of recent
authority. 14 And yet, as Berman aided settlement of one controversy, it
raised the more perplexing problem of- damages. The New Jersey Su-
Study Group, Midtrimester Amniocentesis for Prenatal Diagnosis, 236 J.A.M.A. 1471, 1476 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as NICHD study].
7. Amniocentesis is the process by which a physician removes a sample of the amniotic fluid
surrounding the fetus between the fourteenth and sixteenth weeks of the pregnancy. The amniotic
fluid contains cells shed by the growing fetus. Once the cells are cultured and tested, approximately
sixty serious disorders can be detected, including Down's syndrome. Sammons, Ethical Issues In
Genetic Intervention, 23 Soc. WORK 237 (1978). See note 24 and accompanying text infra.
8. Milunsky, Current Concepts in Genetics: Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders 295 NEw
ENGLAND J. MEo. 377 (1976). See also NICHD study, supra note 6, at 476.
9. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8,11(1979).
10. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the Appellate Division and while their case was
pending before that court, the New Jersey Supreme Court directly certified the case on its own mo-
tion. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979).
11. Id. at 14.
12. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). Gleitman also refused to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful life. This portion of Gleitman remains intact after Berman.
13. Even as late as 1978, the status of wrongful birth claims was unclear. New York, New Jer-
sey, and Texas were considered undecided jurisdictions. Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15, 55-61 (1978).
New York clarified its position in Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Becker held that parents of a deformed child could recover pecuniary damages
resulting from the child's wrongful birth. Texas decisions indicate that a complaint filed by parents of
a deformed child can state a cause of action, Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975), but
parents of healthy children will not have a cause of action because they have been blessed, not
harmed, Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974). Berman now removes New Jersey from the list of undecided jurisdictions; consequently, it
can be said that wrongful birth is a compensable tort where damage can be shown. The remaining
questions will be centered on the fact and amount of damages.
14. For cases recognizing wrongful birth actions, see note 3 supra.
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preme Court held that the plaintiffs could recover damages for emotional
distress, but denied recovery for pecuniary damages. 15 The result is curi-
ous: among jurisdictions recognizing a cause of action in cases involving
impaired children, New Jersey alone grants emotional distress damages;
16
at the same time, it is the only jurisdiction to deny pecuniary damages. 17
This note begins by reviewing developments that created the legal and
social setting for the Berman decision. 18 After analyzing the court's opin-
ion19 the focus shifts to the issue of damages. 20 A valuation scheme is
then proposed to effectuate the conclusion that both pecuniary and emo-
tional damages should be awarded in wrongful birth actions involving im-
paired children. 21
II. BACKGROUND
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,22 decided in 1967, parents of a child born
with sight and hearing defects argued to the New Jersey Supreme Court
that the birth of their child was "wrongful." The Gleitmans alleged that
the defendant doctor failed to inform them of the harmful effects of ru-
bella upon unborn children. 23 Had they been aware of the risks, the plain-
tiffs contended they would have obtained a therapeutic abortion. The par-
ents sought relief for the emotional and pecuniary harm resulting from the
birth of their child.24 Holding that the complaint did not state a valid
cause of action, the court dismissed the case.25
15. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 13-15 (1979).
16. For cases denying emotional distress damages, see, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d
64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233
N.W.2d 372 (1975).
17. For cases granting pecuniary damages, see, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
18. See notes 22-40 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 41-55 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 55-84 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 85-98 and accompanying text infra.
22. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
23. A fetus carried by a woman who contracts rubella may be born suffering from rubella syn-
drome, also known as congenital rubella. Congenital rubella is a disease causing a variety of birth
defects such as sight and hearing impairments, congenital heart problems, and behavioral anomalies.
S. CHESS. S. KORN. & P. FERNANDEZ, PSYcHATRIc DISORDERS OF CHILDREN wITH CONGENITAL RUBELLA
16-18, 145-54 (1971).
24. The Gleitmans' child was partially blind, deaf, and mute. The plaintiffs sought compensation
for emotional harm to the mother, for the normal costs of rearing the child, and for any special costs
that would arise as a result of the defects. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
25. Id. at 694.
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The Gleitman decision rested on two premises: first, compensatory
damages for emotional harm would be impossible to calculate, 26 and sec-
ond, public policy prohibited granting any compensation for the "denial
of the opportunity to terminate the existence of a defective child in em-
bryo. "27 Gleitman v. Cosgrove was followed by other jurisdictions re-
jecting wrongful birth actions. 28
By the time Berman was decided, several developments had eroded the
precedential value of Gleitman. The primary development was the 1973
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade, 29 recognizing a woman's consti-
tutional right to have an abortion. Although the women's right is not ab-
solute, the state's interest in regulating abortions is limited. 30 The consti-
tutional right recognized in Roe has subsequently been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court.31
The legal developments surrounding abortion were paralleled by scien-
tific advancements in prenatal detection of birth defects. Although the use
of amniocentesis was first reported in 1967, the safety and accuracy of the
technique were not conclusively proven until 1976.32 At present, all re-
cognizable chromosomal abnormalities and more than sixty metabolic
disorders can be identified in utero by amniocentesis. 33
These developments combined to shift the course of wrongful birth liti-
gation. In 1975, Texas, in Jacobs v. Theimer,34 and Wisconsin, in Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hospital,35 granted parents relief for the wrongful birth
of their impaired children. Both courts concluded that pecuniary damages
were capable of measurement. 36 They denied emotional distress dam-
ages, however, following the Gleitman premise that the amount of such
damages would be impossible to ascertain. 37
26. Id. at 693.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975)(citing Gleitman); Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff d, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972)(citing
Gleitman).
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a general discussion of the impact of Roe on wrongful birth ac-
tions, see Comment, 14 GONz. L. REv. 891 (1979).
30. Only in the final trimester of a pregnancy does the state have a compelling interest in the life
of the fetus. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,163-64 (1973).
31. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)(state could not require writ-
ten spousal or parental consent as a condition precedent to obtaining an abortion).
32. NICHD study, supra note 6, at 1471.
33. Id.
34. 519S.W.2d846(Tex. 1975).
35. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
36. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (1975).
37. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975).
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In Becker v. Schwartz,38 the New York Court of Appeals recently
abandoned its opposition to wrongful birth claims and followed the lead
of Jacobs and Dumer. Factually, Becker was nearly identical to Berman:
parents of a child with Down's syndrome brought an action against a doc-
tor who allegedly failed to inform the middle-aged mother of the use and
availability of amniocentesis. The New York court held that the claim
was cognizable and that the money needed for the long-term institutional
care of the child would be recoverable. 39 Again, emotional distress dam-
ages were denied!n0
III. THE DECISION IN BERMAN V. ALLAN
The Berman court rejected the two premises of Gleitman.41 In light of
Roe v. Wade, 42 the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that public pol-
icy now supports a woman's right to make a decision regarding abor-
tion.43 The court further concluded that the Gleitman rule would immu-
nize doctors from liability for inadequate genetic counseling. 44 Conse-
quently, the court held that a cause of action founded upon wrongful birth
is a legally cognizable claim. 45
The court then confronted the more troublesome issue of damages. The
plaintiffs first sought to recover the costs of medical care and of raising,
educating, and supervising the child.46 The court conceded that the defen-
dant caused these damages,47 but held that such damages were not recov-
erable. 48 The court's denial of pecuniary damages was founded upon two
premises: that such an award would be wholly disproportionate to the cul-
pability of the physician,49 and that it would allow the parents to realize a
windfall gain by burdening the defendants with the expense of raising a
child while permitting the parents to retain the joys of parenthood. 50
The Berman court treated emotional damages as an entirely separate
issue. The court found that the defendants' negligence deprived the Ber-
38. 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
39. Id. at 415,386 N.E.2d at 814,413 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
40. Id. at 413-15,386 N.E.2d at 813-14,413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-902.
41. 404 A.2d at 14. For an explanation of Gleitman's premises, see notes 26 & 27 and accompa-
nying text supra.
42. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14(1979).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id. at 14.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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mans of the opportunity to accept or reject a parental relationship with
their daughter. As a result, the parents suffered emotional anguish upon
discovering that their daughter suffered from Down's syndrome. 51 Fur-
thermore, the emotional trauma could be expected to continue as the par-
ents raised the child. 52 The Berman court rejected the Gleitman premise
that it would be impossible to place a monetary value on emotional inju-
ries suffered by the parents.53 The court noted that in the twelve years
since Gleitman, courts and juries have become accustomed to the valua-
tion of emotional distress.54 Accordingly, the court held that parents may
recover compensatory damages for any past or future emotional anguish
resulting from the child's condition. 55
IV. ANALYSIS OF BERMAN
A. The Cause ofAction
With Berman, New Jersey joins the growing majority of jurisdictions
recognizing wrongful birth as a valid cause of action. 56 The decision
reaches a sound result and is in accord with the prediction of commenta-
tors. 5
7
The acceptance of wrongful birth actions is usually noted as a develop-
ment in the law of torts, but the cause of action has an important constitu-
tional aspect. Berman's holding gives meaningful content to the right es-
tablished by Roe v. Wade. 58 The right to decide whether to continue a
pregnancy can be meaningless if a woman is not given all the medical
facts necessary to make an informed decision. The health of her fetus may
be the most vital fact in that decision. For this information, a woman
turns to her physician. If that physician negligently fails to meet the stan-
dards of the profession, he should not be insulated from liability. Berman
correctly acknowledges this principle.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 15.
53. Id. at 12, 14-15.
54. Id. at 15; (citing Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754
(1973))(plaintiff may recover emotional distress damages from real estate agency that denied her an
apartment because of marital status and sex); Lemaldi v. De Tomaso of America, Inc., 156 N.J.
Super. Ct. 441, 383 A.2d 1220 (Law Div. 1978)(plaintiff may recover emotional distress damages
from auto dealership for distress arising out of a sequence of automobile breakdowns).
55. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (1979).
56. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
57. For articles noting the trend in wrongful birth actions, see Note, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW, 696,
715 (predicting expansion of wrongful conception claims); Note, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125, 134
(1978).
58. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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B. Damages
1. Pecuniary Damages
Berman's first premise, that pecuniary damages would be wholly
disproportionate to the culpability involved, is based on a misunderstand-
ing of the function of tort law. The function of tort damages is to compen-
sate the victim for harm sustained by reason of the defendaant's wrong.59
Consequently, the amount of the award should be measured by the loss
sustained and not by the culpability of the defendant. 60
Berman's second premise, that an award of pecuniary damages would
allow the parents to realize a windfall gain, unjustifiably assumes that the
joys of parenthood outweigh the burdens in all cases. The "overriding
benefits" presumption has its root in wrongful conception cases61 where
negligence resulted in the birth of a healthy child. 62 Even with the birth of
a healthy child it is a questionable assumption that, as a matter of law, a
birth confers such an overriding benefit.63 But with the birth of an im-
paired child, the presumption is untenable. At the very least, parents of an
impaired child are faced with the special, unexpected, and often immense
costs of treating their child's disorder. The Bermans' child suffered from
Down's syndrome; children with this chromosomal abnormality have
many health problems that can augment medical bills. 64
The fault in the Berman analysis of pecuniary damages is that emo-
tional benefits were offset against the expenses incurred in the care of a
child. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[w]hen the de-
fendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff ... and in so
doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest ... that was harmed,
the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages,
59. W. PRossi, THELAwOFToRTs 6(1971).
60. For example, assume X runs a red light and hits pedestrians A and B. A suffers only slight
cuts and bruises, and incurs only $50 of medical expenses. B, however, suffers a broken neck and
incurs $1,000 of medical expenses. The culpability of X is the same with respect to both plaintiffs.
According to the Berman premise, both plaintiffs would be entitled to the same amount of compensa-
tion, a clearly inappropriate result.
61. For an explanation of "wrongful conception," see note 3 supra.
62. The notion that a birth is always a blessing first appeared by way of dictum in Christensen v.
Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). The blessing theory was developed later in Shaheen
v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957)(denying recovery for wrongful birth because the award of
damages for the birth of a healthy child would be foreign to public sentiments).
63. In Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517-19 (1971), the Michigan
court concluded that economic gains conferred upon parents by their children are non-existent. Fur-
thermore, the court recognized that the benefits of parenthood vary widely from case to case, and it
would be unfair to say as a matter of law that the benefits always outweigh the burdens. See also
Moore, supra note 3, at 7-8.
64. See note 5 supra.
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to the extent that this is equitable.' '65 The Restatement rule applies when
the defendant confers a benefit on the same interest harmed. 66 Berman
lumped together the joys of parenthood and the expenses of child rearing,
and concluded the parents came out ahead. However, in wrongful birth
actions, the pecuniary and emotional interests are distinct and separable.
Even if the two interests could be balanced against each other, the court's
conclusion that the joys of parenthood outweigh the financial burdens is
anomalous. The parents were denied pecuniary damages because they
gained so much "joy and happiness," while at the same time were
granted damages for emotional anguish.
Berman seems to have been misled into this faulty reasoning by Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co.,67 a 1974 Wisconsin case in which advantages
were mistakenly offset against pecuniary burdens. Moreover, the New
Jersey court overlooked the fundamental factual distinction between the
two cases: the Riecks' child was born normal and healthy while the Ber-
mans' child was born with Down's syndrome. The Wisconsin court, in
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,68 later held Rieck not controlling when
impaired children are involved. 69 Dumer held that parents may recover
the costs reasonably necessary to care for the child's deformities. 70 A sur-
vey of jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth actions reveals a con-
sensus that, as in Dumer, pecuniary losses are compensable in cases such
as Berman.71 If any joy resulted from the birth of Sharon Berman, it is a
benefit which should be weighed against the damages for emotional in-
jury; it should not be used to deny compensation for the pecuniary loss.
2. Emotional Damages
Although the Berman court deserves criticism for its departure from the
majority rule in denying pecuniary damages, its departure in allowing re-
covery of emotional distress damages is commendable. Upon the birth of
a child with Down's syndrome, parents experience both shock and
grief.72 Most parents of mentally impaired children continue to suffer
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
66. Id. at Comment b.
67. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W. 2d 242 (1974), cited in Berman, 404 A.2d at 14.
68. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
69. Id. at 378.
70. Id.
71. For jurisdictions granting pecuniary damages, see cases cited in note 17 supra.
72. A. OATH, DowN's SYNDROME AND THE FAMILY 114 (1978); Wolfensberger & Menolascino, A
Theoretical Framework for the Management of Parents of the Mentally Retarded, PSYCHIATRIC AP-
PROACHESTO MENTAL RETARDATION 475, 478 (1970).
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"chronic sorrow" regardless of whether the child is kept at home or insti-
tutionalized. 73
Parents' claims for emotional distress damages have heretofore met
with little success. 74 Judicial responses have ranged from avoidance of
the issue, 75 to denying the damages on odd social theories. 76 The most
typical judicial response has been to deny emotional damages on the
Gleitman premise that such damages are speculative and would be impos-
sible to ascertain. 77 Berman rejected this premise, correctly noting that it
would be a perversion of justice to deny all compensation to the injured
party simply because the wrong itself is of such a nature as to preclude a
precise measure of damages. 78 Furthermore, the unascertainable damages
argument presumes that a trier of fact is incapable of fairly assessing the
harm suffered by an injured party. Yet, as the Berman court noted, dam-
ages for emotional distress have been awarded in an increasing variety of
contexts79 and the valuation of such harm has proven no more difficult
than the valuation of pain and suffering. 80
One argument which has been raised in favor of denying emotional
distress damages is that such an award unfairly discriminates against fa-
thers. The New York Court of Appeals in two decisions8l held that if such
damages were recoverable, they could be awarded to the mother only;
73. Olshansky, Chronic Sorrow: A Response to Having a Mentally Defective Child, 43 Soc.
CAsEwoRK 190 (1962). Olshansky describes the contrast between parents of a healthy child and par-
ents of an impaired child as follows:
The parents of a normal child have to endure many woes, many trials, and many moments of
despair. Almost all these parents know, however, that ultimately the child will become a self-
sufficient adult. By contrast, the parents of a mentally defective child have little to look forward
to; they will always be burdened by the child's unrelenting demands and unabated depen-
dency. . . . Concern about what will happen to his child after he is dead may be a realistic
concern for a parent, or it may be associated with death wishes, either for himself or for his
child.
Id. at 191-92.
74. See cases cited in note 16 supra.
75. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978)(deciding that
because at least damages for medical treatment were recoverable, it was necessary to decide the issue
of "other" damages at the demurrer stage).
76. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979)(holding that damages for emotional
distress must be denied in order to prevent some parents from having a societal advantage over all
parents who suffer at least some degree of stress during child raising).
77. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
78. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (1979)(citing Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,563 (1931)).
79. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979). See also cases cited in note 54 supra.
80. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979).
81. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Howard v.
Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 68, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (majority opinion), 368
(dissenting opinion) (1977).
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since the mother was the doctor's patient, she alone was owed a duty of
care. The Court of Appeals therefore denied emotional damages on the
ground that such an award would result in the drawing of artificial bound-
aries between mother and father.82 An arbitrary line would indeed be
drawn if the New York court's analysis were correct. However, the duty
owed by the physician should not be so narrowly construed. In tort law, a
physician's duty may extend well beyond his patients83 and is tradition-
ally governed by foreseeability. 84 In actions for wrongful birth, a mother
and a father are equally foreseeable plaintiffs; their emotional interests are
derived from one common source-parenthood. Consequently, there is
no need to draw artificial boundaries; a duty should be found to flow to
both parents. The Berman court summarily concluded that both the father
and the mother could recover damages. The Berman decision was correct
but the opinion would have been more persuasive had the court more
thoroughly analyzed this segment of the holding.
V. PROPOSED DAMAGES FORMULA
By allowing recovery of only emotional distress damages and not pe-
cuniary damages, the Berman approach would allow doctors to escape
liability for much of the harm done. Moreover, society should encourage
families to care for special children in the home, and an award of pecuni-
ary damages may make such care possible. The following proposed dam-
ages formula is designed to serve as a guideline in reaching a fair and
accurate assessment of damages in wrongful birth cases involving im-
paired children, though it may also be useful in other wrongful birth ac-
tions.
The court should first recognize that injuries to both pecuniary and
emotional interests are compensable. A court should evaluate the amount
of harm to each interest separately in order to effectuate the Restatement's
rule that benefits to an interest are balanced against the harm to that same
interest. 85
82. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413-14, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
902 (1978); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (majority opinion), 68 (dissent-
ing opinion), 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (majority opinion), 368 (dissenting opinion) (1977).
83. A physician may even have a duty to protect unrelated third parties. See Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976)(holding that a psychothera-
pist has a duty to warn a third party of a patient's threats). New Jersey recently followed Tarasoff in
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. Ct. 466,403 A.2d 500 (1979).
84. See Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); REsTATMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 281, Comment b (1965).
85. See notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text supra.
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Computation of damages should begin with a determination of the
amount of gross (or total) loss to each interest. Then, the trier of fact
should consider elements which reduce the amount of damages suffered;
for conceptual convenience, these elements may be divided into two cate-
gories: benefits and offsets. Benefits refer to direct gains conferred on the
plaintiffs, while offsets refer to indirect gains realized by the plaintiffs as
a result of the defendant's conduct. The valuation process may be ex-
pressed as follows:
(1) damages = pecuniary damages + emotional damages.
(2) pecuniary damages = (gross pecuniary loss - pecuniary benefits) -
pecuniary offsets.
(3) emotional damages = (gross emotional loss - emotional benefits) -
emotional offsets.
A. Pecuniary Damages
1. Gross Pecuniary Loss
Gross pecuniary loss may be measured in two ways. One method con-
siders only the expenses incurred because of the child's deformities; par-
ents may recover expenses only to the extent that the costs of raising the
impaired child exceed the costs of rearing a normal child. This approach
has been taken by Texas86 and Wisconsin 87 in cases involving impaired
children to avoid conflict with prior holdings that parents of normal chil-
dren cannot recover child rearing expenses. 88 These earlier decisions pre-
sumed that the probable earnings of a normal child during his minority
will offset the expenses of rearing him, 89 or, alternatively, that the joy of
raising the child outweighs the economic burden. 90 Even if these pre-
sumptions were true as to normal children, it makes little sense to extend
them to cases involving impaired children.
The better method would recognize all elements of economic loss suf-
fered as a result of the defendant's negligence, thus reflecting a far more
accurate application of tort principles. "But for" the defendant's negli-
gence, no child would have been born and no child rearing or additional
medical expenses would have been incurred. Furthermore, this method
86. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
87. Dumerv. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis. 2d 766,233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
88. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Terrell v. Gar-
cia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
89. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127-28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974).
90. Id. at 128; Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
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avoids the unrealistic assumption that a child's earnings will offset his
expenses; this assumption may have been true in an earlier agrarian soci-
ety, but is unpersuasive today. 91 Recognition of childrearing costs has
special significance in cases of impaired children since impaired children
may be dependent upon their parents far longer than normal children. The
economic drain on the parents is traceable to the defendant's negligence,
and that is where the financial reponsibility should fall.
In addition to childrearing costs, the costs of pregnancy and delivery,
expenses proximately resulting from the defendant's negligence, are
properly includible items in the category of gross pecuniary loss.
2. Pecuniary Benefits
The amount of gross pecuniary damages should be reduced by the
amount of any direct pecuniary benefits to the plaintiffs resulting from the
defendant's conduct. For example, a child's earnings would be a direct
benefit in theory; in reality, impaired children will rarely contribute to
their parent's financial security. On the facts in Berman, no pecuniary
benefits are discernible.
3. Pecuniary Offsets
Finally, to reach a fair and accurate assessment of pecuniary damages,
the amount of gross damages should be reduced by the amount of pecuni-
ary offsets, which can be defined as indirect gains conferred upon the
plaintiffs as a result of the tortious conduct. More specifically, offsets are
the costs that the plaintiffs would have incurred had the defendant fully
and properly informed the parents. In Berman, the plaintiffs contended
that but for the defendants' negligence, the chromosomal defect would
have been detected and the pregnancy terminated. Thus, pecuniary off-
sets would properly have included the costs of amniocentesis and an abor-
tion.
B. Emotional Damages
1. Gross Emotional Damages
To reach a fair assessment of emotional anguish suffered, the trier of
fact should begin by reviewing evidence indicating the degree of harm.
91. Troppiv. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187N.W.2d511,518(1971).
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The extent of each parent's emotional anguish may vary; many factors
such as ethnic or cultural background, religion, and social class affect the
intensity of each parent's anguish. 92
2. Emotional Benefits
Some parents may derive emotional rewards from caring for impaired
children. 93 Such rewards are unlikely to outweigh the emotional trauma,
but if an emotional benefit exists, it should be considered in reducing the
amount of damages awarded.
3. Emotional Offsets
Finally, the trier of fact should consider the emotional trauma that
would have occurred had the defendant properly informed the parents.
Research indicates that women experience anxiety as they await the re-
sults of amniocentesis. 94 Upon learning of the defective fetus, parents ex-
perience shock and grief which may be compounded as the parents make
the decision to have an abortion. 95 The abortion itself may cause depres-
sion. In fact, parents who obtain a selective abortion because the fetus
was defective may experience more trauma than parents who obtain an
abortion merely because the entire pregnancy was unwanted. 96 The emo-
tional trauma that would have occurred even if the defendant had acted
properly is a proper offset that should be considered in reducing the dam-
age award.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tort law is a mechanism of social engineering. 97 As such, it should be
utilized to encourage physicians to carry out their duty of disclosing
92. Olshansky, supra note 73, at 191; Wolfensberger & Menolascino, supra note 72, at 483.
93. Some parents learn to accept their child's abnormalities, and are able to integrate the child
into their family. As one mother of a Down's syndrome child reflected, "when the sorrow
passes . . . then the happiness sets in. Every moment of every day is a complete revelation of what
these children can do and accomplish." D. SMrm & A. WILsoN, supra note 5, at 97. Some parents
may not be able to cope with the Down's syndrome child, and will choose institutionalization. Id. at
102-04; A. GA'H, supra note at 72, at 116. The grief of parents varies so widely that each case and
each parent's trauma should be evaluated individually.
94. Sammons, supra note 7, at 237.
95. See generally Sammons, supra note 7.
96. Id. at 239.
97. W. PRossR,THeLAwOFToRTs 14-15 (1971).
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genetic information to pregnant women thereby making more meaningful
the constitutional right established by Roe v. Wade. 98
Once all the elements of a negligence action have been established,
logic and justice require that a defendant be held liable for all damages
naturally flowing from the breach of duty. In wrongful birth actions, two
distinct interests are subject to the risk of harm, an emotional and a pe-
cuniary interest. Harm to either interest is equally real and deserving of
compensation. The goal of tort compensation is to put plaintiffs in the
position they would have been in but for the defendant's negligence. This
is an impossible goal in wrongful birth actions; yet, the valuation process
proposed in this note provides a satisfactory method of compensating the
aggrieved parents.
T. Ryan Durkan
98. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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